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After Unilateral Declaration of Independence Kosovo s main struggle
is to position itself in the best way within the international community.
Being a new state is like a newborn child who requires support from everyone
to get used to and fit into the new life. However, the way the status of Kosovo
was resolved seems to put more hardship on Kosovo. Current global
development with Cold War rhetoric between the West and Russia
and the row over independence could make it very difficult for Kosovo to
establish relations with other states and enter international organizations such
as the UN, NATO, and the EU Thus, Kosovo has to make a lot of efforts and
drain a lot of energy in to lobbying process to get as much recognition as
possible. Joining the above mentioned organizations will be very important and
will facilitate the engagement of the newborn state in international relations.
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1. Introduction
Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia
on 17February 2008 promising to be a democratic state
of all its citizens regardless of nation, religion, cultural
or language background 1. The declaration of independ-
ence came after 2 years of official negotiations and al-
most 9 years since the installation of the UN adminis-
tration that followed NATO air strikes. Failed attempts
by the UN spacine envoy for Kosovo former Presi-
dent of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari to bring about a com-
mon solution for both parties led to deep divisions be-
tween permanent members of the UN Security Coun-
cil (SC). SC did not put into agenda the proposal of
Martti Ahtisaari for the final settlement of the status of
Kosovo knowing that it would be a failure because of
Russian clear threat to veto it. The proposal suggested
a kind of an internationally supervised independence
with specific internal arrangements with due regard for
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the position of minorities, especially the Serb minority.
Despite all the favourite provisions and affirmative ac-
tion towards minorities it was rejected by the Serbian
side. With tacit agreement of independence support-
ers, mainly from the US and western European states,
Kosovo's prime minister declared independence on 17
February 2008. It was followed by a recommendation
of the Secretary General to allow deployment of the
EU rule oflaw mission under the name ofEULEX. All
these steps created a unique situation in which Resolu-
tion 1244 is still being active with EULEX established
by a decision of the European Council.
The aim of this paper is to discuss the interna-
tional political position of Kosovo after its declara-
tion of independence. An independent state cannot
stand alone and its statehood needs to be acknowl-
edged and supported by other states, which in turn
influences international position of Kosovo with re-
gards to other states and international organizations
as well. So far, Kosovo has been recognized by 45
countries including the US and most of EU coun-
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tries. However, Kosovo needs more recognition to join
most important international organizations it aspires
to. In most international organizations the principle
of equality of states is of paramount value meaning
that all states composing the particular organization
have equal right of vote which means that Kosovo
has to get the required majority of votes to enter an
international organization. The decision-making on
important matters in some international organizations
such as the EU is based on consensus, while in the
others such as the UN the decision-making mecha-
nism is more complicated, it is a two-tier system
shared between Security Council and General Assem-
bly while it also gives the right to veto to some states.
Kosovo needs more recognition to enter important in-
ternational organizations it aspires. This paper will
focus on Kosovo's efforts to enter three important in-
ternational organizations: UN, NATO and EU.
2. Failed Mediation Attempts to
Settle the Final Status of Kosovo
Recognizing the need to determine the future
status of Kosovo but concerned with the democrati-
zation process, especially the situation of the minori-
ties, the international community created standards
that needed to be met by Kosovo institutions. In this
process international community firstly adopted the
policy of "standards before status" to be changed later
to "standards with status" apparently showing confi-
dence towards Kosovo institutions but also avoiding
any situation which could be misused by Belgrade in
its efforts to block moving forward of the process.
These standards consisted of eight main benchmarks
that would have been used to test the ability ofKosovo
institutions to build a legal state, and, in particular,
protect minorities'. A successful evaluation of these
standards would begin the negotiating process. The
green light was given after the UN special representa-
tive Kay Eide, presented a positive report to the SRSG
on the fulfilment of standards. On October 7, 2005,
the UN Secretary General informed the Security Coun-
cil that conditions existed for a dialogue to begin, with
the international community mediating the negotia-
tions. To facilitate the process of negotiation, the
UNSC appointed its special envoy (SE), the former
Finish Prime Minister, Martti Ahtisaari to mediate and
facilitate the negotiating process. Ahtisaari office
would be named United Nations Office of Special
Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK)3.
Due to conflicting interests between the two par-
ties, the Contact Group constructed ten basic princi-
ples upon which the future status should be determined".
The most important principle is principle no. 6, which
states firmly that Kosovo will not return to its status
before March 1999, that there will be no partition, and
that there will be no union with another state.
During negotiation process, Martti Ahtisaari
used different forms of diplomacy ranging from shut-
tle diplomacy to facilitating direct negotiations of both
parties in Vienna. "The SE and the Deputy SE (DSE)
paid their first visit to the parties and the region in
November 2005, visiting Prishtina and Belgrade, as
well as the neighbouring capitals of Tirana, Podgorica
and Skopje. Since then, the Special Envoy, his Deputy
and senior staff members ofUNOSEK have made fre-
quent visits to the region. In the course of 2006,
UNOSEK held 15 rounds of direct talks between the
Belgrade and Pristina negotiating teams'.
On 25 January 2007, the Special Envoy met
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-
moon, in Paris to briefhim on the latest developments
in the status process and share with him the proposal.
The next day, the Special Envoy met in Vienna with
the Contact Group members and also shared the con-
tent of his proposal, as part of the regular consulta-
tions and close cooperation process between
UNOSEK and the CG. The proposal was presented
to the concerned parties beginning of February to be
followed by two series of meetings between them in
Vienna, on 21 February and 2 March 2007, and a fi-
nal one on March 10. At the end of the High level
meeting (10 March), the Special Envoy observed that
there was no will from the parties to move away from
their previously stated positions. Left with no doubt
that the parties' respective positions on Kosovo's sta-
tus did not contain any common ground to achieve an
agreement and that no amount of additional negotia-
tion would change that fact, the Special Envoy con-
cluded that the potential of negotiations was exhausted.
He announced his intention to finalize his proposal
for submission to the UN Security Council in the
course of the month of March.
On 14 March, Deputy Special Envoy Albert
Rohan went to New York to hand over to the Secre-
tary-General the Final Comprehensive proposal for a
Kosovo Status Settlement, as well as the Report of
the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on
Kosovo's Future Status. The report and the Compre-
hensive proposals were officially delivered to the UN
Security Council member on 26 March". In a letter
dated 26 March 2007 the Secretary General addressed
the UN Security Council on the Report of the Special
Envoy of the Secretary General on the future status of
Kosovo. The report recommends that Kosovo should
be given independence under the supervision of in-
ternational community, which will allow Kosovo to
enter international agreements and international or-
ganizations such as the UN, WTO, IMF, etc. The re-
port suggests that reintegration into Serbia is not a
viable solution due to a history of "enmity and mis-
trust" that has long antagonized relationship between
Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. It also gives importance
to the situation on the ground during the past eight
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years of Kosovo's governance independent of Bel-
grade authorities. The report also draws the attention
of the international community to the continuance of
status quo, which could lead to destabilization of
Kosovo and potentially the region as the frustration
of the majority ofthe people ofKosovo is under strain
after 8 years of waiting". Despite broad endorsement
by state and international organization officials" the
document failed to get support of the Sc. It even did
not get that far as to be put in the official agenda of
the SC because of Russia's clear threat that it would
use veto if the proposal was put on the table for vot-
ing which would of course determine the fate of the
whole process to follow. Despite possible obstacles
due to the lack of endorsement for independence by
the SC, the newly elected government ofKosovo move
on to unilateral declaration of the independence of
the Republic ofKosovo after almost nine years of in-
ternational administration.
3. Unilateral Declaration of
Independence and Reincarnation
of a Formally Dead Document
Democratically elected parliament of Kosovo
declared independence of the Republic ofKosovo on
17 February 2008 in a well prepared ceremony. The
declaration of independence was read by the former
political leader of Kosovo Liberation Army, Hashim
Thaci. The declaration declared independence of
Kosovo while acknowledging an extended EU pres-
ence under the name ofEULEX and ignoring UNMIK
suggesting that Kosovo's institutions would gradually
stop respecting authority of international administra-
tion under the name ofUNMIK thus seizing the power
formerly in the hands of that administration". The EU
mission started to build up its presence since June in a
process which is going very slowly and is not com-
plete yet. By accepting the EU presence in Kosovo
according to Ahtisaari's plan the Declaration of Inde-
pendence actually declared a so called supervised in-
dependence as envisioned in the Ahtisaari's proposal.
Endorsing Ahtisaari's plan Kosovo committed itself
to respect ethnic minorities rights and decentralize
power as well as to create more municipalities with
Serb majority. In this way Kosovo reincarnated a for-
mally dead document which could not receive endorse-
ment by the SC due to veto threats by Russia. Refer-
ence to Ahtisaari's proposal was the best way to yield
some legitimacy. After all, Martti Ahtisaari was a per-
son appointed by the Secretary General of the UN to
act on its behalf to bring about a final solution for the
status of Kosovo. The Declaration of Independence
made it easier for other states to recognise Kosovo.
The constitution ofKosovo which entered into
force in June 2008 finalized the creation of a new state
and established the Republic of Kosovo as an inde-
pendent and sovereign state within its borders. It also
endorses the highest standards of human rights with
the most important international human rights trea-
ties being directly applicable in the Republic of
Kosovo'".
The unilateral declaration of independence cre-
ated a unique and challenging situation in Kosovo.
The declaration and the constitution of Kosovo were
designed to give full authority to the institutions demo-
cratically elected by the people of Kosovo. It means
that the so called reserved powers of UNMIK would
now be in the hands of Kosovo's institutions. In his
speech to the SC Mr. Zanieri stated that UNMIK au-
thority was fundamentally challenged and Kosovo
authorities took control of the situation.
But on the other side, formally, UNMIK still
exists because the SC failed to suspend its Resolution
establishing it in the first place while EULEX started
to be delpoyed in Kosovo in an effort to functionalize
its mandate granted under the EU Council Joint ac-
tion of 4 February 200811• Faced with the new situa-
tion the Secretary General assigned his new Special
Representative for Kosovo, Alberto Zanieri to instruct
him later to start the process of the so called
reconfiguration. During this process the UNMIK
would gradually start to shrink in size while Kosovo
authorities will take over the power and EULEX will
expand its mission in Kosovo.
However, Serbia and majority of the Serb
Kosovo refused to recognize Kosovo although Serb
politicians hold positions of Ministers in the Govern-
ment of Kosovo and are also deputies in the Parlia-
ment of Kosovo. In a deftant move the Serb minority
in Kosovo organized local elections thus electing par-
alleIlocal authorities in Kosovo. However, Mitrovica
North where Kosovo still cannot stretch its authority
remains a hot spot. At the same time, although pro-
claimed illegal, there are some signs that these paral-
lel structures could be legitimized in some way to help
the dialogue on technical issues.
4. International Recognition of
the Republic of Kosovo and Its
Perspective of Entering UN,
NATO and EU
The lack of support by the Security Council
proved to be a big challenge for Kosovo authorities
and supporters of Ahtisaari's proposal. Kosovo's uni-
lateral declaration of independence was to be coordi-
nated with its main supporters with recognition com-
ing within hours of declaration, such as with the dec-
laration of recognition coming for the USA, France,
Costa Rica, Turkey, etc. It should be noted that the
states that formally recognized the Republic ofKosovo
recognized it as a fully sovereign state, which is not
stated in its declaration. For example, the President
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of the USA stated "on behalf of the American people,
I hereby recognize Kosovo as an independent and sov-
ereign state" although according to the declaration of
independence and following Ahtisaari's proposal
Kosovo is a state under international supervision.
Again the declaration of recognition of France states
that "France recognized the Republic of Kosovo as
independent and sovereign state?".
Since its declaration of independence on 17
February 2008 Kosovo has been recognized by 52
countries. Many states are still neutral but have de-
clared that they will accept official documents which
are issued by Kosovo authorities including passport,
car registration plates, etc. meaning that in the near
future many of those states will issue formal recogni-
tion. In fact recognition of passports and other offi-
cial documents in international law could be implied
as a taci t recognition of a state 13. So far, Kosovo could
be proud for having some of the most powerful states
issuing formal recognition including the USA, Japan,
Canada, Australia and most of the EU member states.
They represent 7 out ofG8 group with more than 60%
of the world GDP.
Kosovo needs quantitative recognition to be
able to enter international organizations through which
it can benefit politically and economically. Because
of the nature ofintergovemmental organizations each
vote counts and the states are equal regardless of their
wealth, political or economical status. This is one of
the main principles enshrined in the UN Charter". The
principle of equality is fundamentally realized through
voting rights. But in some financial and monetary or-
ganizations such as the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund the voting rights of its members are
exercised according to their membership fees". It ap-
pears that admission of Kosovo to these two organi-
zations would be easier as those countries that have
recognized Kosovo hold most votes within the sys-
tem. Kosovo has already applied to these organiza-
tions and the Director of the World Bank affirmed
that saying that they regard Kosovo as an independ-
ent state and will consider the application for mem-
bership. He also stated that the membership to the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund is not
linked to the UN membership". Membership in these
two organizations would be very beneficial to the eco-
nomic recovery and independence of Kosovo.
The story is different with other important or-
ganizations to which Kosovo aspires. The UN is the
largest and most representative intergovernrnental or-
ganization. According to the Charter there are two cri-
teria for a state to become a member: it should be a
peace loving state and it should endorse the principles
of the Charter which Kosovo is ready to fulfil 17. The
UN membership is important for Kosovo inmany ways.
First of all it would legitimize the new state ofKosovo
by including it in this intranational organization but
also implying that states who voted in favour of the
Kosovo's UN membership recognize Kosovo. Sec-
ondly, Kosovo would become a part of an organization
of collective security within which Kosovo would get
guarantees of territorial integrity and sovereignty in
compliance with the principles of the Charter. At the
same time Kosovo would be a part of an international
forum where different policies are made.
However, mainly because of Russia's strong
opposition to the independence ofKosovo, the mem-
bership to the UN currently seems to be years away.
The membership to the UN consists in two phases.
First, it should be recommended by the SC and then
the positive recommendation is sent to the GA for
voting. Voting procedures in the SC for new members
are stated in Article 27 saying that for procedural
matter it needs 9 votes pro to approve a decision while
for other important matters it requires 9 votes pro to
include five votes of permanent members of the SC
or nine votes pro but no veto from any permanent
member state which means abstention 18. As this point
it seems that Kosovo membership to the UN is some
time away because of Russia's determination to op-
pose the independence ofKosovo. In the GA Kosovo
would need two thirds of the votes meaning that
Kosovo would need around 130 states to vote pro
Kosovo membership".
Membership to NATO is another aspiration of
Kosovo and a very important one. NATO is a politi-
cal-military organization based on democratic values
with the principle of collective defence as its primary
objective. Today NATO in its redesigned role after
the Cold War is involved in providing security in many
countries outside Europe, such as in Afghanistan,
Sudan, etc., which has been its main territorial activ-
ity. In order to become a NATO member Kosovo will
have to prove that it is a democratic country and wants
to join NATO, but also it should generate security in
the region and beyond. The former two requirements
are an easy part since Kosovo has now formally es-
tablished a sustainable democracy by organizing free
and fair elections and accountability process towards
its citizen while most of the population of Kosovo
overwhelmingly support NATO membership. The lat-
ter criteria can become very delicate because of the
still tense situation in the region and internal arrange-
ment of Kosovo. Ethnic situation in Kosovo, its fac-
tual division of Mitrovica North and Serbian readi-
ness to manipulate the Serb minority within Kosovo
can destabilize the new state in which case KFOR
troops would still be necessary in their peacekeeping
mission. Such is the case with national and local Serb
elections when Serbia encouraged Serb minorities to
organize local elections in Kosovo and form parallel
institutions regardless of Kosovo's and UNMIK's
opposition that deemed them to be illegal.
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The NATO membership is also related to the
readiness of its members to admit Kosovo as an equal
partner. In this case all members need to agree in
favour of membership in order for Kosovo to be ad-
mitted to NAT020. There are obstacles in this process
because some member states have not yet recognized
Kosovo, i.e. Spain, Greece, Portugal, etc. Internally it
would be the United States, Britain, France and Ger-
many as the big players within NATO who could play
an important role in pursuing other countries to vote
in favour of the Kosovo membership.
The European Union is another important or-
ganization. Accession to the EU would mean that most
of the European continent countries, currently 27, would
recognize the new state ofKosovo. The EU has stated
many times that the western Balkans belong to Europe
and thus are welcome in the EU. Membership to EU is
also important in many other ways, mainly it will be a
part of a very strong economic community but also it
will provide a sense of a European identity. Accession
to the EU would mean economic and political support
for Kosovo through different means.
The EU can also prove to be e very good incen-
tive for setting aside deeply rooted differences between
Kosovo and Serbia and look for something they have
in common such as economic and political stability but
also a European identity. It is something that all Bal-
kans nations want. Serbia is among the countries look-
ing forward to the EU membership despite many state-
ments by Serbian officials saying that they will not step
down in their claim for Kosovo in exchange for the EU
membership". However serious are these declaration
the EU membership of Kosovo and Serbia would be
the best way to turn away from nationalistic feelings
and look for a prosperous future.
There are many complex criteria for the EU
membership, related to political and economic fac-
tors which the state must fulfil in order to become a
membership candidate. In particular a state has to have
affmity towards comrnunitarism and being able to live
with the norms common to many communities. The
process is known as the implementation of acquis
commun antaire in which case Kosovo needs to har-
monize its legislature with that of the European Un-
ion. Acquis commun antaire cover 30 different areas
including democratic institutions, market economy,
fiscal policy, etc. After harmonizing its legislation to
that of the EU, Kosovo may become a membership
candidate in which case all of the EU members would
have to vote in favour ofKosovo to become a full EU
member.
5. Conclusion
Kosovo is the youngest state in Europa and is
recognized by 52 states by october 2008 since its
establishment. The existence of a state is a factual
matter and its recognition is a political decision of
each state. Kosovo needs more recognition in order
to better succeed in its path to a better future. Kosovo
has to develop its relations with other states and re-
cover its ruined economy as a result of the past war.
More recognition would mean greater legitimacy for
the newest state but also development of economic
relations. More recognition means better chances for
Kosovo to enter aspired international organizations.
It will also help to make the pressure on Russia and
other countries who openly oppose independence of
Kosovo, to join the ranks of countries that recognize
Kosovo or at least to not impede Kosovo's action to
join international organizations.
The history of the EU tells us a good story on
how, at times, worst enemies can become closest
friends in their quest for a better future. Joint admis-
sion ofKosovo and Serbia to the EU could certainly
follow that path. Focusing ourselves in finding com-
mon issues with common solutions is the best way
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